

SECRET

PSB

Apr 26
Oct 25

TENTATIVE AGENDA
Psychological Strategy Board
Fourth Meeting
Thursday, 25 October 1951
2:30 P.M.
New State Department Building

- 1. PSB D 7/A Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease Fire Negotiations

Difference in views to be reconciled prior to presentation to the Board.

- 2. PSB D 8 Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations during General Hostilities

state doesn't want this up next Thursday

Submitted to the Board for approval.

Psychological Strategy Board

25X6

Policy in this connection to be established by the Board covering liaison of either a formal or informal nature. Such action may be particularly desirable if the National Psychological Operations Plan for General Hostilities is implemented (Agenda Item No. 2)

- 4. PSB D 10 Preliminary Report on Situation with respect to Repatriation of Prisoners of War

Review of a report to be submitted to the senior NSC staff in response to action agreed to at senior NSC staff meeting of 27 September.

which may or may not be filed with rec. - memo states prior differences between State & Defense. (Board suggests filing only with Department so nothing is lost.)

Approval of 1952 (Revised) and 1953 PSB Budget

Statement as presented to the Board to be approved.

Overall Psychological Operations Plans for the Middle East

The advisability of undertaking such a study to be discussed.

- 7. Report on Psychological Operations Presentation at the American Legion Convention

Brief presentation will be made

- 8. The Question of the Role of the PSB in the Use of Special Agents Provided in the Military Security Act of 1951

100-000000 - at PSB. discuss this - for reference for NSC or other purposes.

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Staff suggests a Board.

PSB: 1) Call joint meeting all agencies involved

2) - send ref to form panel formed - over which PSB will be preside

3) Prepare & submit to President recommendations for proper coordination

Hess

Greg - all changes made in personnel
& differences of opinion noted.
Director shd call attention to such divergences.

Paras - not necessarily rep. departments or Agencies.

Shd Board advise staff to take on
resp. for guidance paper on "fantastic weapons,"
state inclined to mime. yet.

only on highest level i.e. - Board Affairs.
because of extreme sensitivity of info. concerned -

Greg: can be discussion of where in govt this question
should be handled.

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Copy 2 of 6 copies

ORIGINAL	STATE	DOYANE	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I. PURPOSE 1. To prepare a national psychological warfare plan for use in time of general war.	I. PURPOSE SAME	I. PURPOSE SAME	I. PURPOSE ALL COMMENTS SHOW AS SUPPLEMENT, REPORT AS SHOWN BELOW
II. RATIONALE 2. See Annex I - Intelligence Summary	II. RATIONALE 2. See Annex I - Intelligence Summary REASON: Intelligence summary not considered necessary as part of this plan	II. RATIONALE 2. See Annex I - Intelligence Summary REASON: It is not considered necessary to include an intelligence summary as part of this plan.	
III. SCOPE 3. To wage U.S. psychological warfare in order to render neutral assistance in achieving national objectives and in winning the war.	III. SCOPE 3. To wage U.S. psychological warfare in order to render neutral assistance in achieving national objectives and in winning the war. REASON: To make clear that finding the war is included in, not separate from, national objectives.	III. SCOPE 3. To wage U.S. psychological warfare in order to render neutral assistance in achieving national objectives and in winning the war.	
IV. ASSUMPTIONS 4. The United States and its allies are engaged in a general war forced upon them by the USSR or any of its satellites.	IV. ASSUMPTIONS 4. 2. That the United States and its allies are engaged in a general war forced upon them by the USSR or any of its satellites.	IV. ASSUMPTIONS 4. 2. The United States and its allies are engaged in a general war forced upon them by the USSR or any of its satellites.	
V. NATIONAL WAR OBJECTIVES 5. During a general war United States National Objectives vis-a-vis the USSR will be as set forth in Paragraphs 13g and h of NSC 52/4. *13. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to levels which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations. b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to secure of the purposes and principles set forth in the UN Charter.	V. NATIONAL WAR OBJECTIVES 5. 4. During a general war United States National Objectives vis-a-vis the USSR will be, unless modified by appropriate authority, as set forth in Paragraphs 13g and h of NSC 52/4. *13. To counter the threats to our national security and well-being posed by the USSR, our general objectives with respect to Russia, shall be as follows: a. SAME b. SAME *13. Regarding these objectives due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions upon which our way of life is based. REASON: 1. Duplicate language NSC 52/4 and State Dept. as "Executive" - no official statement of our objectives. 2. Unless modified, etc., inserted to provide for possible expansion of NSC 52/4. 3. Paragraphs beginning "To counter" and "To bring about" inserted in order to quote more fully paragraph 13 of NSC 52/4.	V. NATIONAL WAR OBJECTIVES 5. 4. During a general war United States National Objectives vis-a-vis the USSR will be as set forth in paragraph 13 of NSC 52/4. *13. To counter the threats to our national security and well-being posed by the USSR, our general objectives with respect to Russia, shall be as follows, in time of peace as well as in time of war should be: a. SAME b. SAME *13. Regarding these objectives due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions upon which our way of life is based.	
VI. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION 6. Psychological warfare is an instrument of national policy during war and is an integral part of the national war effort. 7. Psychological warfare policy must be consistent with national strategy. To this end psychological warfare policy must be coordinated with all major aspects of national strategy and national objectives which take account of the capabilities of psychological warfare. 8. Psychological warfare principles, objectives and tasks as enumerated in Annex II of this plan are designed to facilitate the launching of a dynamic psychological warfare offensive at the outbreak of a general war. 9. The psychological warfare objectives are determined by national policy and are, therefore, subject to modification only as national policy may be modified. Any departure from this principle will lead to ineffective, uncoordinated and perhaps disastrous results. 10. Review of the objectives and tasks embodied in this plan must be made at regular intervals, or whenever deemed necessary, to insure conformity with national policy. Changes in national psychological warfare policy, including new national objectives, will be made at the national level. 11. United States policies and national plans for psychological warfare will be coordinated, as appropriate, with our allies at the governmental level.	VI. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION 6. 5. SAME as 6, crossed out. Psychological warfare operations in support of national strategy or war are established instruments of national policy and, therefore, must be consistent with and subordinate to the national war objectives. REASON: A more explicit basic principle of operation. 7. SAME, crossed out. REASON: Necessary in light of paragraph 5, above. 8. Psychological warfare principles, objectives and tasks as enumerated in Annex II of this plan are designed to facilitate the launching of a dynamic psychological warfare offensive at the outbreak of a general war. REASON: Annex I incorporates for more operations only. 9. The psychological warfare objectives are determined by national policy and are, therefore, subject to modification only as national policy may be modified. Any departure from this principle will lead to ineffective, uncoordinated and perhaps disastrous results. REASON: Clarification. Last sentence unnecessary. 10. 2. Review of the objectives and tasks embodied in this plan must be made at regular intervals, or whenever deemed necessary, to insure conformity with national policy. Changes in national psychological warfare policy, including new national objectives, will be made at the national level. REASON: The Psychological Warfare Board has this authority under Presidential Order of 4 April, 1951. 11. 2. United States policies....(SAME)	VI. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION 6. 5. SAME as 6, crossed out. Psychological warfare operations in support of national strategy or war are established instruments of national policy and, therefore, must be consistent with and subordinate to the national war objectives. REASON: A more explicit basic principle of operation. 7. SAME, crossed out. REASON: Necessary in light of paragraph 5, above. 8. 5. SAME as State Dept. (column 2) 9. 7. The psychological warfare objectives are determined by national policy and are, therefore, subject to modification only as national policy may be modified. Any departure from this principle will lead to ineffective, uncoordinated and perhaps disastrous results. REASON: For clarification of intent and consistency with the mission. 10. 2. Review of the objectives and tasks embodied in this plan must be made at regular intervals, or whenever deemed necessary, to insure conformity with national policy and war objectives. Changes in national psychological warfare policy, including new national objectives, will be made at the national level, with the approval and coordination of the Psychological Warfare Board. REASON: The Psychological Warfare Board has this authority under Presidential Order of 4 April 1951. 11. 2. United States policies....(SAME)	VI. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION 6. 5. Same as before, with following added: "The potentialities of psychological action as a weapon on the one hand, and the psychological impact of military, political, and economic actions on the other, must be taken into consideration in the formulation of national strategy." REASON: To stress full recognition of the psychological implications inherent in the other elements of national power. 6. 5. In this Paragraph, eliminate the word "never", in the 3rd line. REASON: The restrictive and not consistent with Paragraph 5.

ORIGINAL
12. Under the principle of centralized responsibility at the national level, organizational arrangements made within the Government to formulate policies and plans for, and to coordinate the worldwide conduct of, psychological warfare during a general war must provide for:

- a. Authority to issue psychological warfare policy to departments and agencies executing psychological warfare.
- b. Representation at the policy level of all departments and agencies executing major portions of the psychological warfare program.
- c. Psychological warfare policies and plans will be coordinated with domestic information and with consular.

VI. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

11. Responsibility for broad policy formulation, planning, coordination and evaluation of the United States psychological warfare effort will be centralized at the national level.

15. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for planning and execution of U.S. psychological warfare in theaters of military operations directed toward the enemy, enemy-occupied or allied-occupied territories, in conformity with established national or allied policy.

16. The Department of State will be responsible for the planning and execution of U.S. psychological warfare in areas other than theaters of military operations, in conformity with established national or allied policy.

17. In situations in which a theater of military operations embraces territory of governments which exercise civil authority and to which a U.S. diplomatic mission is accredited:

- a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for the execution of all psychological warfare necessary for the accomplishment of its mission as stated in Paragraph 15 above.
- b. The Department of State will be responsible for planning and execution of psychological warfare other than that indicated in subparagraph 17a above.
- c. The Department of State, in agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may assume the planning and execution of portions of the mission as stated in Paragraph 17 a above.
- d. Arrangements shall be made to ensure coordination of psychological warfare conducted by the theater commander and the chief of mission.

18. Subject to the responsibilities established by paragraphs 15, 16, and 17 above, JIA will execute overt (black) and covert (gray) psychological warfare in accordance with interdepartmental agreements to be established. These agreements will define the lines of demarcation between overt (black), gray and covert (white) psychological warfare operations and the assignment of strategic and tactical targets. JIA will coordinate the planning for overt (black) and gray psychological warfare with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and JIA in accordance with the responsibilities established in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 above. In the field, operations will be under the direction of U.S. Military Officers in theaters of military operations. Operations will be coordinated with the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in areas other than theaters of military operations.

19. Psychological warfare operations originating in areas other than theaters of military operations, but directed toward these areas, will be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when such operations have a direct impact on current or future military actions. Conversely, psychological warfare operations originating in, and directed toward, theaters of military operations will be coordinated with other U.S. departments and agencies when such operations have a direct impact on the current or future psychological warfare activities of those departments or agencies in areas other than theaters of military operations.

STATE
12. SAME, crossed out.
a. SAME, crossed out.
b. SAME, crossed out.

REASON: Not required in view of the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Board under Presidential Executive Order of 4 April 1951. See Section 71, Paragraph 11.

VI. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

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DEFENSE
12. SAME, crossed out.
a. SAME, crossed out.
b. SAME, crossed out.

REASON: SAME as State (column 2)

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12. In this paragraph, 2nd line, add the word "over" between the words "U.S." and "Psychological Warfare."

REASON: Consistency with NSG 10/2.

16. In this paragraph, 2nd line, add the word "over" between the words "U.S." and "Psychological Warfare."

REASON: Consistency with NSG 10/2.

18. This paragraph is changed to read as follows: "Overt psychological warfare will be planned and conducted in accordance with responsibilities prescribed by the NSG and the Psychological Warfare Board."

REASON: To make sentence less restrictive.

ORIGINAL

20. The Central Intelligence Agency will see that appropriate intelligence support is provided for psychological warfare and that the intelligence activities of government departments and agencies in this field are properly coordinated.

21. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for any necessary coordination of national psychological warfare plans and operations with those under military command of other governments or allied commanders.

22. All other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government engaged in conducting psychological warfare outside the U.S. will:

a. Adhere to policy guidance issued at the national level.

b. Coordinate their plans and policies with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for activities in theaters of military operations or with the Secretary of State in areas other than theaters of military operations.

c. Coordinate their operations in the field, which are based on plans and policies coordinated at the national level, with the senior U.S. military officer in theaters of military operations or with the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in areas other than theaters of military operations.

STATE

(S). SAME as original.

21. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for any necessary coordination of psychological warfare plans and operations in theaters of military operations with those under military command of other governments or allied commanders.

REASON: To define area of responsibility more specifically.
20. The Department of State will be responsible for any necessary coordination of psychological warfare plans and operations with those under military command of other governments or allied commanders.
REASON: Complements paragraph 17.

22. (S). SAME.

a. Adhere to policy guidance issued at the national level by the Psychological Strategy Board.

b. SAME.

c. Coordinate their operations in the field, which are based on plans and policies coordinated at the national level, with the senior U.S. military officer in theaters of military operations or with the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in areas other than theaters of military operations.
REASON: The Psychological Strategy Board has this authority since Presidential Decree of 4 April, 1951.

20. SAME as 20 in original, as shown above.

DEFENSE

20. (S). SAME as original.

21. (S). SAME as original.

22. (S). SAME.

a. SAME as original.

b. Coordinate their plans and policies with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for activities in theaters of military operations or with the Secretary of State in areas other than theaters of military operations.

c. Coordinate their operations in the field, which are based on plans and policies coordinated at the national level, with the senior U.S. military officer in theaters of military operations or with the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission in areas other than theaters of military operations.

20. SAME as 20 in original, as shown above.

VII. ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

21. Information facilities and appropriate personnel of the Department of State and other supporting agencies in areas which become theaters of military operations will be made available to the senior U.S. military officer in that theater under statutory and other competent authority during the appropriate period of military control in that area. Plans for orderly transfer, and later return, of information facilities and appropriate personnel of the Department of State and other supporting agencies will be coordinated at the national level. Such plans, as they affect the Central Intelligence Agency will be drawn up as to delineate the responsibilities set forth in paragraph 18 above.

REASON: a. The Psychological Strategy Board represents the national level.
b. CIA is not involved in this principle.

VII. ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

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REASON: a. The Psychological Strategy Board represents the national level.
b. CIA is not involved in this principle.

VII. ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

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REASON: SAME as State (column 2).

22. 20. To this paragraph, add the word "correct" between the words "plans" and "executing" at both places where these words occur in the paragraph (lines 2 and 5).
REASON: To make paragraph consistent with JCS message.

VIII. DEFINITIONS

21. For definitions pertaining to this plan see Annex III. 22. For definitions pertaining to this plan see Annex III II.

IX. ACTION

21. All departments and agencies of the Government responsible for executing portions of this plan will make detailed plans and preparations for carrying out its provisions.

REASON: Clarity.

VIII. DEFINITIONS

21. For definitions pertaining to this plan see Annex III. 22. For definitions pertaining to this plan see Annex III II.

IX. ACTION

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REASON: Clarity.

VIII. DEFINITIONS

21. SAME as State (column 2).

IX. ACTION

21. SAME as State (column 2).

22. 21. SAME as State (column 2).

REASON: Clarity.